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LAWRENCE C. BECKER

Criminal Attempt and the
Theory of the Law of Crimes

The fundamental problem addressed in this paper is that of getting
an adequate rational justification for the distinction the law draws
between criminal and noncriminal wrongs. But because theorizing
about the law is not only vacuous but likely to be positively misguided
apart from a consideration of concrete issues in the law, I want to
frame the discussion of theory with an example of its application.
I have chosen, as the example, a proposal for reforming the law of
criminal attempt-specifically the proposal that, at least in many
cases, successful crimes and (the corresponding) attempted crimes
should be punished equally. I have chosen this example both because
it has intrinsic interest and because the current status of attempt law,
as well as discussion of it, directly reflects what I will argue is a
mistaken theory of the law of crimes, and thus is a oonvenient way of
introducing my own view. Due to the fact that the law of attempts has
several complex elements, much of what follows will be about those
elements. But this should not be allowed to mask the fact that the
philosophical crux of the paper is in its discussion of the fundamental
aims of criminal law.
There are two additional remarks to be made as preliminaries.
I am indebted to Joseph Raz, Thomas T. Lawson, Theodore Long, Lewis H.
La Rue, and the members of the Hollins College Seminar in Philosophy for help
with an early draft of this paper. Jesse Zeldin and Roscoe Hill gave me useful
bibliographical material at the same stage. A shortened version was read to the
Virginia Philosophical Association in October 1973. Valuable criticism from that
group, from Charles A. Fried, and from the editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs,
have gone into the current version of the paper.

Criminal Attempt and the
Theory of the Law of Crimes

First, I will speak throughout of punishment for crimes, because that
is the traditional way of speaking. But my argument is independent
of the question of whether we should "punish" criminals, in the usual
sense, at all. Everything argued for here is perfectly compatible with
less retributivistic ways of speaking. Further, the proposal for equal
penalization of attempts and successes is independent of the question
of whether one should equalize the penalties by raising those for attempt or by lowering those for success.
Second, and more importantly, it must be noted that there is general
agreement that no adequate single principle can be found which
will provide a rational basis for the full variety of wrongs currently
involved in the criminal/noncriminal distinction. The law has grown
in too random a fashion for that, and we shall, I suppose, never be
able to find a plausible theory of the law of crimes which justifies both
treating pilfering petty cash as criminal and certain sorts of highly
harmful breaches of contract as noncriminal. An historical explanation is one thing; no doubt we can get that. But a single justifying
principle is quite another matter. This is the difficulty which has led
some writers to do little more than state the problem and then give
up,1 and has caused others simply to ignore the problem for more
promising pursuits. 2
But while it may not be possible-or even important-to get an adequate single distinguishing principle, it is possible, I think, and quite
important to get clear on what is fundamentally at stake here: that is,
why it is that we mark off the major sorts of criminal wrongs from
others and make them part of public, rather than private, law. This is
an important task because there is general consensus in the legal
profession on this more limited version of the problem, and I am convinced that the consensus has latched onto a mistaken theory-a theory
which is reflected in the treatment of attempted crimes, and which has
contributed to the quite unnecessary overestimate of just how far from
rational consistency the criminal law as a whole is.
See P. J. Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment (Oxford, I962), p. 7.
2. Glanville Williams, for example, in his enormous textbook on English
criminal law, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed. (London, I96I), does not
devote so much as a sentence to an attempt to define his subject in a general
way.
1.
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I

The common law was late in recognizing attempts as criminal. Early
English law started from the principle that an attempt to do harm
was no offense. 3 Of course, if a man wounded another in an attempt
to kill him (or to steal from him, etc.), he could be punished for the
wounding. But that was not punishment for an attempt at the more
serious crime, and, apparently, if no physical damage was done by an
attempt, no prosecution was possible, nor thought to be proper:!' It was
not until the sixteenth century, in the Court of the Star Chamber, that
the criminal law was consistently extended to attempts, and then it
was apparently only extended to attempted felonies. 5
The modern doctrine of criminal attempt had to wait until 1801 for
its formulation. The case was Rex v. Higgins, a prosecution for the
3. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2nd ed. I898: in the I952
reprint by Cambridge University Press) II, p. 475 remark that the principle in
English law at the end of the middle ages was "where there is no harm done,
no crime is committed; an attempt to commit a crime is no crime." At page 509,
they remark that this is true "as a general rule" of ancient (English) law.
The situation was somewhat different on the Continent. Attempts were apparently punished there all through the middle ages, though scholars have had
little success in uncovering any theoretical discussion of the practice from that
time. By the sixteenth century, attempt was included in recognized Continental
criminal codes. See Jerome Hall, "Criminal Attempt: A Study of Foundations
of Criminal Liability," Yale Law Journal 49 (I940): 789-79I.
4. See Henrici de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae (Twiss,
ed. I878) vol. II, p. 337, where Bracton quotes as "well known" [illud] a phrase
refusing penalties for attempts: "for what harm did the attempt cause, since the
injury took no effect?" There was, however, an early English law against unlawful assembly, rout, and riot which held that any assembly of three or more
persons for an illegal purpose, involving action toward that purpose, was punishable as a rout. As with the many acts held to constitute treason (e.g., writing
letters denouncing the King, or making a bet that he would not live long), it is
a fairly small conceptual step from such laws to the notion of criminal attempt.
There are three early cases, in addition, which are sometimes cited as deviations
from the usual practice. In one, reported in 27 Ass. pI. 38 (I353), Shardlowe, J.
said, "One who is taken in the act of robbery or burglary even though he does not
carry it out, will be hanged according to the law." The other two cases concern
attempted murder, and in both cases, the culprits were hanged, the judges citing
the maxim volantas reputabitur pro facto [the will is to be taken for the deed].
This particular excursion into Latin maxims quickly proved embarrassing and
was not pursued in subsequent decisions. See, for a review of these matters,
Jerome Hall, op. cit.
5. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 796-797.
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misdemeanor of solicitation. Higgins had asked a man's servant to
steal a quantity of rope from the servant's master. The servant did
nothing, but the plot was discovered and Higgins was brought to trial.
His counsel argued that although an attempted felony was a crime,
an attempt at a misdemeanor was not, and Higgins' act had clearly
been no more than an abortive attempt at the misdemeanor of solicitation. He was, however, convicted and the Court said in part: "every
attempt to commit a crime, whether felony or misdemeanor, is itself
a misdemeanor and indictable."6 This piece of judicial legislation was
a success, and has been followed faithfully since.
The situation at present is that, in England, criminal attempts remain punishable as common-law misdemeanors, with life imprisonment as a theoretical maximum. In practice, however, courts normally
award lighter sentences for attempts than they do for complete offenses, and in some cases, statutes require this. 7 In the U.S., "the usual
punishment grading system for attempt involves making [attempt]
punishable by a reduced factor of the punishment for the completed
crime. In California [for example] attempt carries a maximum term of
not more than one-half of the highest maximum term authorized for
the completed crime."8 In a small number of states-e.g., Illinois and
Mississippi-most attempts are punished equally with successes. But
even here, attempts at first degree felonies are punished less severely
than the completed crimes. We can say, then, that the current practice
generally treats attempted crimes more leniently than completed
ones. 9
6. R. v. Higgins [I80I] 2 East S at II; 102 E.R. 269 at 272.
7. Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment, p. 98.
8. Sanford H. Kadish and Monrad G. Paulsen, Criminal Law and Its Processes,
2nd ed. (Boston, 1969), p. 368.
9. The Model Penal Code, however, recommends the following sort of law:
"Except as otherwise provided in this Section, attempt . . . [is a crime] of the
same grade and degree as the most serious offense which is attempted.... An
attempt ... to commit a [capital crime or a] felony of the first degree is a felony
of the second degree" (American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1962),
§S.OS(I)). Earlier cultures in the West have also tended toward the more stringent approach. The Romans punished attempts, and though for "ordinary"
crimes an attempt got a lighter penalty than a success, for "atrocious" crimes
attempts were apparently punished just as severely as completed crimes, at least
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The standard arguments in support of current practice make the
following points: 10
( I) The Reform Argument. They acknowledge that, in terms of the
reformative aims of penal sanctions, there is probably no point in distinguishing between attempts and successes. One who tries and fails
is not likely (merely from that fact) to be in less need of reform than
one who tries and succeeds. Thus we have some reason for punishing
attempts and successes equally.
(2) The Deterrence Argument. On the other hand, they hold that
lesser penalties for attempts do not reduce the deterrent effect of the
law, for at the stage when a person is contemplating a crime, the penalty which has deterrent force for him (if any) is the one for what he
intends to do. On the assumption that the criminal does not intend
as long as the result of the attempt was not insignificant. See Hall, "Criminal
Attempt," p. 790. And Plato has this to say about attempted murder:
If anyone has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy,
and whom the law does not permit him to slay, and he wounds him, but is
unable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not to be
pitied-he deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as a murderer and
be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune which in a manner has
favored him, and to the providence which in pity to him and to the wounded
man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an accursed fate and
calamity-as a thank-offering to this deity, and in order not to oppose his willin such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and only compel the
offender to emigrate to a neighboring city for the rest of his life, where he
shall remain in the enjoyment of all of his possessions. But if he have injured
the wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court
deciding the case assess ... (Plato, Laws, Book IX: 877; trans. Jowett, Modern Library Editions, vol. 2, p. 621).

In all these instances, however, from the earliest to the latest, there has been
hesitation, if not fiat refusal, to treat attempt and success alike for all crimes,
and ever to impose the death penalty for an attempt.
Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law II, p. 497 n. 2, say, however, "It
is further to be remembered that among some barbarous folks, which are not
utterly lawless, successful theft is regarded with tolerance, if not admiration,
and gives rise to a mere claim for the restoration of the goods, while 'manifest
theft' is unsuccessful theft and exposes the thief to a beating."
10. Examples of such arguments may be found in P. J. Fitzgerald, Criminal
Law and Punishment, p. 98; Waite, John Barker, The Prevention of Repeated
Crime (Ann Arbor, 1943), pp. 8-9; Hall, "Criminal Attempt," p. 817 n. 130; and
American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 10 (1960), comment
to §S.oS.
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merely to attempt, but rather to succeed, it follows that the severity
of the penalty for attempt has little or no force as a deterrent. In accordance with the principle of minimizing pain, then, we have some
reason for giving lesser penalties for attempts than for successes.
(3) The Unequal Harm Argument. The conflict between (I) and
(2) is resolved, or so the arguments go, by noting that since attempts
do less actual harm than successes, the principles of proportionality
and similar treatment for similar cases combine on the side of (2) to
require the lesser penalties. We are committed, for good reason, to
making the severity of punishments roughly proportionate to the gravity of the wrongs done. (Consider, for example, the injunctions
against "cruel and unusual pUnishments"-ordinarily interpreted to
mean excessive or disproportionate punishments.) We are also committed, of course, as a part of a general commitment to rational decision-making, to treating similar wrongs similarly. If attempts do less
harm than successes, the latter principle requires us to class them, on
that basis at least, with crimes of similar gravity-Le., not with successes. And if the penalty is to be proportional to the gravity of the
offense, the lesser wrongs should get lesser penalties.
I shall not deal with all the issues raised by such arguments. Specifically, I shall not attack the deterrence argument (2), even though I
think it is contestable. I shall, rather, challenge the theory of criminal
wrongs implicit in the unequal harm argument (3). If that argument
falls, as it may when the theory of criminal wrongs is revised, and it is
replaced with an equal harm argument (3) the principles of proportionality and similar treatment for similar cases will combine on the
side of the reform argument (I )-which I assume is uncontestable-to
support equal punishment for attempts and successes.
I,

II

A leading characteristic of the criminal law is that it is public law-a
region in which society itself takes the initiative for prosecution and
itself exacts the penalty. The major sorts of wrongs we classify as
criminal are as old as law itself (murder, mayhem, theft ... ), but
primitive law typically treated such matters, along with what we now
call torts and breaches of contract, as private law problemsY It was
II. B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law (Oxford, 1962), p. 208.
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not that people were then unaware of the distinction between murder
and accidental death through negligence (or at least it would be odd
to suppose so). They merely treated the two wrongs-legally-in the
same way: by using the legal process to establish who the wrongdoer
was, and to see to it that he made amends to the injured party. Thus
indemnities were often acceptable penalties for killings of both sorts,
and when they were not, they were replaced with Solomon-like provisions which emphasized the private law nature of the system: e.g., if
X falls from a tree and kills Y, Y's kinsman, if he insists on vengeance,
is entitled to climb a tree and fall on X.12
It is characteristic of private law that the initiative for prosecution
rests with the injured party (or his representatives), and that the issue
at stake is the satisfaction of his grievance. At some point (it is not
clear just when) certain wrongs began to get special treatment. Prosecution in these cases no longer depended on the initiative of the injured party; and the penalties assessed the wrongdoer were less and
less designed to "satisfy" the victim. The thief was imprisoned rather
than forced to make restitution.
The historical explanation for this shift (which, of course, was a
gradual process) is no doubt complex. Political utility was quite likely
a large part of the cause, both in terms of the administration of the
thickets of laws drawn up to protect and strengthen monarchs, and in
terms of handling public outrage and public safety in the case of particularly vicious wrongdoers. Further, it is reasonable to suppose that
as governments grew in strength, and sought popular support in terms
of the stability and protection they could afford to citizens, the development of a public law response to particularly "visible" and unsettling
wrongs would follow. In addition, there were doubtless some moral
demands which found expression in the growth of public law-particularly the principles of equity and desert in cases where no injured
party remained to initiate an action (as in the murder of a destitute
and "relationless" person), and probably convictions about Divine Law
as well in cases where the government put itself forward as a servant
of such.
12. Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. n, p. 471, quote Leges Henrici at 90.§7 as
saying that "if by mischance you fall from a tree upon me and kill me, then, if
my kinsman must needs have vengeance, he may climb a tree and fall upon you."
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But an historical explanation is one thing, and a rational justification is another. It is the public law character of the whole criminal law
as it now exists-from whatever historical causes-which must be justified, and it is clear that the hodgepodge of reasons one can assemble
from the causes listed above will not even begin to produce a justification. Why should the law take over the prosecution of fraud but not
intentional breach of contract? Why should the prosecution of motor
vehicle homicide be a matter for public initiative (and the penalty be
imprisonment, even when the wrongdoer is uninsured) when deaths
caused by the negligence of one's employer are not? Why, in general,
is the amount of damage done to the victim, or the amount.of suffering
he endures, or his capacity to initiate and carry through a prosecution
not even a relevant factor in deciding which wrongs will be publicly
prosecuted? (Mter all, one can die just as horrible a death by someone's noncriminal negligence as by intentional criminal conduct. And
one can be just as incapable, financially or otherwise, of carrying
through a lawsuit for breach of contract as one may be in carrying
through a criminal prosecution.) And why are the penalties of the
criminal law not directed toward recompense of the victim, at least
where possible?
When jurisprudents have reached for an answer to such questionsor rather, to the general question of what is fundamentally at stake in
distinguishing criminal from noncriminal wrongs-they have typically
said two things: first, that the relevant distinguishing characteristic
of the major sorts of wrongs defined as criminal is that they are social
or public harms; and second, that no single distinguishing prinCiple
can be found for the full range of criminal wrongs.
The former point has become Virtually an uncontested definition in
the law,13 Its rational appeal is obvious. If some harms are harms to
13. "A crime may be described as an act, default or conduct prejudicial to the
community, the commission of which by law renders the person responsible
liable to punishment . . ." (P. G. Osborn, A Concise Law Dictionary, 5th ed.
[London, 1964], p. 97). "The distinction between a crime and a tort or civil
injury is that the former is a breach and violation of the public right and of
duties due to the whole community considered as such, and in its social and
aggregate capacity; whereas the latter is an infringement or privation of the
civil rights of individuals merely." Or again, "A crime, as opposed to a civil
injury, is the violation of a right, considered in reference to the evil tendency
of such violation, as regards the community at large" (Black's Law Dictionary,
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the community as a whole, then it is only fitting that the community
itself, through its legal officers, take the initiative for prosecution. And
it is likewise fitting that the sanctions imposed for these harms should
be designed to get the necessary community benefits (e.g., reform and
deterrence). Indeed, it is hard to see what other theory could account
for both public initiative and public-regarding sanctions for anything
like the list of wrongs we now define as criminal.
One can, of course, argue for public initiative as a way of spreading
the cost of (personally) important prosecutions, but then one cannot
draw the public/private law distinction between crimes on the one
hand and torts and contract on the other. Moreover, one has no
ground, on that account, for public-regarding sanctions. Any argument adequate to establish the justifiability of such sanctions-even if
it is expressed in terms of the state's duty to enforce morality or Divine
Law-will, it seems, be some version of a social harm argument. Similarly for straight social utility arguments. They either concern rectifying or preventing disutility consequent to the wrongs done, in which
case they are social harm arguments; or else they concern simple expediency for the political/legal process, in which case both the list of
crimes we have and the public-regarding sanctions we have appear
bizarre.
So if there is a rational justification for the public law response to
what we call crimes, it appears that it must be some version of the
standard legal thesis that crimes are social harms. I say "some version"
of the thesis because just anything which harms the community cannot plaUSibly be a candidate for the crime category. In general, the
law restricts the social harms involved to those produced by intentional, malicious conduct which is aimed at doing (or tends to do)
4th ed. revised [St. Paul, 1968], p. 443). See also pp. 1-14 of the standard hornbook on the substantive criminal law, LaFave and Scott, Handbook on Criminal
Law (St. Paul, 1972).
Such definitions are also commonplace in the cases: "All such acts or attempts
as tend to the prejudice of the community are indictable" (R. v. Higgins [1801]
2 East 5). ''The common law is sufficiently broad to punish as a misdemeanor
... any act which directly injures or tends to injure the public to such an extent
as to require the state to interfere ..." (Commonwealth v. Mochan 177 Pa. Super.
454, IIO A. 2nd 788). There has been much judicial discussion of the proper
scope of such pronouncements, but that this approach to what makes an act
criminal is the correct one does not seem to be in dispute.
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physical or financial damage to persons or property, and "wanton" or
"willful" negligence which shows a "reckless or indifferent disregard"
of the health and safety of others.14 The explication of the social harm
argument must account for why these sorts of social harm-and not
those produced by "lesser" negligence, for example-justify a public law response. As noted previously, it is not likely that the whole
list of things the law currently defines as criminal can be justified on
some such ground. The law has grown too randomly to make such an
expectation reasonable. 15 This need not destroy the importance of the
point, however, that the main body of criminal wrongs can be understood in terms of a social harm principle.
What makes all this interesting in the case of criminal attempt is
that jUrisprudents in favor of lesser penalties for attempts appear to
forget their own theory of criminal wrongs when they make the unequal harm argument [(3) above]. When they argue for the lesser
penalty on the basis of penalties proportional to the harm done, they
are clearly referring to the harm done to the individual victims, since
they treat the point about lesser harm resulting from attempts as an
obvious one-as a truism requiring no argument. The issue of whether
less social (Le., criminal) harm is done by attempts than by completed
crimes is of course not nearly so clear. It is not clear partly because
the sort of social harm at stake in the distinction between criminal
and tortious wrongs is rarely made explicit. I intend to make it explicit below, but the first correction to be made to arguments about
criminal attempt is simply this: that they must show that attempts
produce less specifically criminal harm than do completed crimes.
But is this true of attempts? I think not, even though an affirmative
answer has some plausibility. The plausibility rests on a mistaken notion of the sort of social harm the criminal law is specifically aimed at.
Consider the following (erroneous) line of argument: A mere attempt
on the life of Robert Kennedy during his campaign (even if, like the
14. See the definition of criminal negligence in Bell v. Commonwealth, 170
Va. 597; 195 S.E. 675 at 68I.
15. In fact, as Fitzgerald actually argues, to "explain" the whole list we are
forced to say simply that "whether or not any conduct constitutes a crime . . .
depends solely on whether or not such conduct has been proscribed as criminal
by the law. The hallmark of criminality is that it is a breach of the criminal law"
(Fitzgerald, Criminal Law and Punishment, p. 7).
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attempt on George Wallace, its effect had been to cripple him and stop
his candidacy) would have been much less socially damaging than
what actually happened. Indeed, the differences in the public responses to both actual events are, in part, an example of the ways in
which we may say that a killing does more social damage than a crippling. In the former case there was a great deal more public turmoil
(desire for revenge, dislocation of the political structure, violation of
expectations, frustration of desires) which had to be dealt with than in
the latter. The reasons for this are no doubt to be found in people's
reactions to the amount of harm suffered by the victims (and in their
attitudes toward the victims). Furthermore, of course, in the former
case, the victim was lost to society forever, while in the latter case, he
can still contribute, even if at a reduced level. In short, since an attempt does less social (criminal) harm than a completed crime, it can
reasonably be punished less severely.
This sort of argument will not do, however. Mter all, if we are to
determine the severity of the penalty on the basis of the sorts of social
harm this argument refers to, then we must distinguish among attempts as well as between attempts and successes, for some attempts
do much more of the sort of social damage referred to than do others.
And we would be forced to distinguish various attempts on a basis
which violates one of the most firmly justified controlling principles
of law. Mter all, an attempt on the life of a gangster will presumably
do less social damage than the same sort of attempt on the life of a
beloved public figure. To distinguish them on that basis would put us
in the untenable position of having to decide, perhaps as a matter of
statute, how much to punish an offender on the basis of how "popular"
and socially useful his victim happened to be. Clearly this would violate, at a minimum, one of our most deeply felt and thoroughly justified moral and legal principles: that of equal protection under the law.
For if anyone who is contemplating murdering me knows that his
penalty will be next to nothing compared to that of someone who kills,
or tries to kill, Martin Luther King (because, in terms of the sorts of
social value at issue here, I am next to nothing compared to Martin
Luther King), then the law hardly protects me at all, let alone equally.
The initial plausibility of this interpretation of criminal harm, then,
falls away sharply when its consequences are made plain.
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There is, however, a sort of social harm which is at the root of
criminality and which argues strongly for treating not only all "attempters" alike (regardless of the status of their victims and the
amount of harm done to them) but also argues for treating at least
some attempts with the same severity as completions. This is the social
harm done, the social volatility, if you like, consequent to the process
of doing the major sorts of conduct we punish criminally.16
To explain: when a person is killed by accident, we respond very
differently than we do to a premeditated murder or to voluntary or
involuntary manslaughter. More exactly, our normal responses to accidents, regardless of intensity, regardless of the amount of damage
done to victims or to SOciety at large, are not socially volatile. That is,
they do not have the potential for destructive disturbance of fundamental social structures to be found in our responses to intentional,
malicious harms, or even to extreme negligence. What calls forth a
socially volatile response to the latter sorts of acts is their relation to
what might be called socially unstable character traits. To wit:
Let us define perfect social stability as that state of affairs in which
everyone always acts in ways which are "socially justifiable" (Le., in
ways which are at least consistent with the maintenance of social
coherence, social institutions and the systems of mutual expectations
necessary for the productivity of the members of sOciety). Perfect social stability is no doubt only approachable as a limit, and indeed may
not even be a desirable achievement. But it is clear that it is not even
approachable unless each of us can have assurance that his person
and activities will not be unjustifiably interfered with by others. For
insofar as I do not possess such assurance, my own criteria for decision-making will (only rationally) include the prospect of abandoning
my own SOcially stable behavior in self-defense. This is what I describe
16. While unconventional, the approach developed here is anticipated by some
remarks of Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law II, p. 503, with regard
to the law of treason. In discussing treason law prior to its crystallization into an
elaborate statute in 1352 (25 Edw. III, stat. 5, cap. 2), and specifically those
parts of it which penalize conspiracies, "compassing" the king's death, and the
like, they say: " ... in marked contrast to the general drift of our old criminal
law, the crime was in this case found, not in a harmful result, but in the endeavour to produce it ..." (emphasis added).
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as a volatile response, and its community-wide occurrence is social
volatility.
Assurance about the justifiable behavior of others depends upon beliefs or assumptions about, and consequent trust in, their dispositions
to behave in justifiable ways-that is, on belief in their not having
socially unstable character traits. There are, of course, many kinds of
such traits. The disposition to break one's promise whenever it is convenient is one, and a harmful one. Promise-breaking can do social as
well as personal damage, and its spread community-wide would certainly create a socially volatile situation. But individual instances of
promise-breaking are not, at least in our society, typically productive
of social volatility. X may break his promise to Y, and Y may kill
him for it (surely a personally volatile response), but it is typically
the killing, and not the breaking of the promise, which produces the
community-wide volatility. The most malicious, deceitful dealing imaginable may tum a family out in the cold, but the typical public response is an affirmation of socially stable behavior (through, for example, public support for the family and scorn for the wrongdoer),
and not a chain reaction breakdown of such behavior in self-defenseY
Some unstable traits, thus, get a socially volatile response while
others do not. And social volatility is to be regarded as a disvalue in
itself, the creation of which, by acts produced by an individual's socially unstable character traits, is a social harm. It is this sort of social
harm, I want to argue, which justifies the public law response we
make by defining the acts involved as criminal. And it is the absence
of such harm, together with the other arguments which support mens
rea and actus reus requirements, which justifiably excludes some
wrongs from the category of a crime. Similarly, it is the (supposed)
absence of such harm which alone could justify leaving intentional,
but yet personally and socially harmful, breaches of contract to private
law.
I7. The law sometimes recognizes this in a big way in its handling of rescue
cases. See, for example, the incredible case of Yania v. Bigan 347 Pa. 3I6; I55
A. 2nd 343 (I959) in which Bigan "enticed, taunted and inveigled" Yania to
jump into a trench ten feet deep in water, and then stood by doing nothing while
Yania drowned. Bigan was not even held civilly liable, let alone criminally
liable.
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The interpretation of criminal harm as the harm consequent to the
social volatility of conduct thus makes a good deal of sense out of the
current list of things defined as criminal, the list of things defined as
noncriminal, and the insistence of jurisprudents that social harm is
the issue at stake in justifying the two lists as they (mostly) stand. 18
It also, of course, gives some rationale (however inadequate) for the
general absence of reparation-to-the-victim in criminal sanctions.
Reparation for the amount of harm done to the victims is not a part
of the logic of opting for a public law response at all. Thus the criminal
penalties for murder and for negligent manslaughter may justifiably
be different, even though the harm to the victims is the same. And the
penalties for attempts and completed crimes need not be different,
merely on the ground of a difference in the amount of harm to the
victims.
Two things are important to keep in mind, however, about this line
of argument. First, the sorts of socially unstable character traits which
produce a socially volatile response probably vary considerably from
culture to culture. Which traits produce such a response in any given
time and place is an empirical issue, and one to be taken seriously by
any proposal for law reform. Second, the amount of social volatility
(and consequent harm) produced by various types of crimes is also an
empirical issue, though I want to argue that there is no reason in
general for thinking it to be less for attempts than for successes.
With these two cautions in mind, we may proceed. The argument
against the general conclusion that attempts should be punished less
severely than successes may be put briefly as follows. Once we acknowledge that it is social harm which is specifically criminal, then
we must recognize that the sort of social harm involved is precisely
the harm consequent to the social volatility of the conduct at issue. It
is this sort of social harm for which we punish a person's successful
18. There are notable exceptions. There are, for example, regions of both
strict and vicarious liability in the criminal law. The concept of criminality
developed here will not apply to them. But I think these cases may be safely
ignored for present purposes. They do not represent the major thrust of the
criminal law, and there is nearly continuous, vigorous debate over the justifiability of such laws (as one would expect, were the theory proposed here the
correct explication of the distinction).
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criminal conduct. And it is the same sort of social harm for which we
punish criminal attempts. Now it seems plausible to suppose that, at
least for many sorts of crimes, no less of such harm is done by attempts then by successes, for the breakdown of the assurance of social
stability (Le., of one agent's contribution toward it) is complete once
the attempt has been made, and made known. A rash of public shootings, successful or not, are socially volatile. I see no reason to suppose
that attempts are, in general, any less "public," and thus less productive of social harm, than successes. Some attempts, such as the one
on George Wallace's life, are more public than nearly all successful
murders, while some murders are never discovered by anyone and thus
cannot do any of the sort of social harm at issue here. These vagaries,
and others like them, must be ignored for present purposes. Just as it
is unjustifiable to make the severity of the penalty depend on the
prominence or social usefulness of the victim, so it would be unjustifiable to make the penalty depend on the amount of subsequent publicity produced at the discretion of news agencies; or, indeed, to make
it depend on the degree of success a criminal has in keeping things
quiet. Once we have decided on a public law response to certain
wrongs, and decided roughly how much social harm (conditions of
public information being equal) each type of wrongdoing causes,
principles of equal treatment and advance notice require the sort of
variables mentioned above to be disregarded. When this is done, there
is no difficulty in seeing that the killer who fails because his bullet
accidently hits his victim's belt buckle is no less a social menace in
the requisite sense than one who succeeds because his victim happens
to be wearing suspenders.
The usual rationale for treating attempts, in general, less severely
than successes thus breaks down: attempts are seen as presumptively
equal in social harm to successes; the principles of proportionality and
similar treatment for similar cases thus require that, unless the presumption is rebutted, attempts be treated equally with successes, and
combined with the admittedly equal needs of the attempters and the
successful for reform [the reform argument (I) above], the deterrence
argument [( 2) above] is overwhelmed.
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III

As a convenient way of advancing additional arguments for it, I want
now to consider a set of objections to the theory of criminal wrongs
just presented.
A. Confusion of General Justifying Principle with Regulative Principles. It might be urged that the construction of an elaborate theory
of social volatility to supplant a perfectly straightforward theory of
social harm suggested by the Kennedy-Wallace example is based on a
simple confusion. It might be maintained that the general justification
for treating X as a public law matter is indeed its potential for social
harm of the "usual" sort (e.g., the "costs" to society, etc.), but what
controls the grading of the particular sort of offense is the amount of
harm done to the victim, just as what controls the amount of punishment meted out to a particular offender is (or ought to be) its utility
for reform and deterrence. Thus there is no problem with differential
punishments depending on how "popular" one's victim happens to be.
The general principle controls only the public-lawIprivate-Iaw decision; other principles regulate the grading of offenses and sentencing.
There is much that could be said in response to such an objection,
but it will suffice to produce the sort of counterexample which can be
generalized. On the theory advanced by this objection, premeditated
murder and motor vehicle homicide must be graded at the same level.
We typically think (for good reasons, I believe) not only that both offenses are properly public law matters (as this theory also would have
it), but that they are not offenses of equal "criminal" gravity. But if
offenses are to be graded on the basis of the amount of harm done to
the victim(s ), then the two forms of homicide cannot, on that basis, be
distinguished. This counterexample has a structure which can be filled
in many ways. Generally speaking, it shows that the objection ignores
what we typically take (quite justifiably, I believe) to be a crucial element in the grading of crimes-mens rea. It cannot be repaired by importing intent into the grading process, for that simply raises the question of why intent is a crucial factor-and that question leads directly
to the sort of social harm argument I propose. How can intent be the
factor which controls our decision to classify a given act as criminal?
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Only, it seems, if intentional wrongdoing is socially damaging in a
way that other sorts are not. What could such a way be, if not through
social volatility?
B. Having It Both Ways. It might also be urged, however, that the
"usuaY' sort of social harm was faulted for violating a cherished principle of justice (equal protection) while a similar failing of the new
interpretation of social harm was passed over smoothly. If the new
interpretation can be shored up by introducing a principle which
"holds" publicity equal for instances of a given crime (in order to meet
the requirements of justice), then surely the "usual" interpretation
can be shored up in a similar way. So what reason is there' for opting
for one interpretation over the other?
The reply here may also be brief. The equal protection problem is
a difficulty for the usual interpretation of the social harm argument,
but alone it is not decisive. What is decisive is that in addition to this
difficulty, the usual interpretation-just as is so, ultimately, for objection A above-cannot give an account of why mens rea is a crucial element in the grading of crimes. To do so it would have to invoke a
theory of social volatility, and once that is done (and the harm consequent to the status of the victim is held constant for reasons of equal
protection), one doesn't have the "usual" interpretation at all, but in
effect at least, the one I propose. To see this clearly, one need only ask
how one could account, on the usual theory, for treating injuries produced negligently differently than the same injuries intentionally and
maliciously produced. 19
C. Oversimplification. The theory of criminal wrong presented here
may also be attacked as oversimplified. Even granting that the rationale for the public law response to certain wrongs may have to be elabI9. It might be noted that in tort law, as well as criminal law, intentional
wrongs are distinguished in important ways from negligent ones. For one thing,
victims of intentional torts are able to collect punitive or exemplary damages.
In addition they need not always be able to show actual injury from the wrong,
whereas such a showing is a necessary part of an action for negligence. And in
some cases, time limitations on the initiation of an action are more generous
to victims of intentional torts than to victims of negligence. See Charles O.
Gregory and Harry Kalven, Jr., Cases and Materials on Torts, 2nd ed. (Boston,
I969) p. 23. Whether the rationale for this difference is in any way related to
the concept of social volatility is unclear.
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orated along those lines, it surely is obvious that the criminal law-even
for intentional and malicious injuries-has a much more complex social function than that. We take the administration of justice out of the
hands of injured parties to prevent blood feuds and the vicious self perpetuating cycles of revenge they spawn. This we find socially necessary,
just as we find it necessary to go further and make prosecutions a
matter of public initiative. But we must recognize the tendency these
necessary steps have to impart a sense of frustration and alienation
to the injured parties and to the sympathetic public at large. A vicious
crime is committed, and immediately upon the capture of the culprit
the engines of justice start to grind in virtual isolation from those most
profoundly concerned. The outraged public is an impotent spectator;
the victim is at best a mere source of evidence. Yet precisely in terms
of the sort of social volatility described above, this sense of frustration and alienation can be the source of Significant social instability.
So we punish to reform and to deter, certainly. But we also must punish
to satisfy the desire for retaliation felt by victims of crime and to
satisfy the public outrage generated by those crimes. Thus, the logic
of reparation and retaliation must remain very much a part of the
criminal law. The severity of penalties must reflect that logiC. Does
this not mean, then, that equal penalties for attempts and successes
would be viewed as excessive-and perhaps further aggravate the
sense that the criminal law is something alien and unresponsive to
the needs of those most directly concerned?20
The answer to the question must be, I think, no. The places where
the logic of retaliation becomes a factor in the grading of crimes are
(i) where the penalties dictated by the grading are less than what is
needed for retributive satisfaction; and (ii) where the penalties dictated by the grading are felt to be excessive. In either of those cases,
one can imagine social instability arising. But clearly neither of those
cases obtain for attempts if the analysis I propose is correct. In terms
of reform, a penalty equal to that for success is indicated, and the
proposed analysis of criminal harm supports equalization in general.
Unless the penalty for success is too low for retributive satisfaction,
20. For a similar argument in favor of lesser penalties for attempts, see
Wechsler and Michael, "A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II," Columbia Law
Review 37 (1937): 1290-1298.
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there is no way the proposal for equalization could result in damage
under (i) above. Further, the proposed analysis of criminal harm
argues against the view that the equalization of penalties is excessive
by providing grounds for a presumptive claim of the equal social
harm of attempts and successes. It is true that if one considers only
the physical harm done to the victims, the equalization proposal may
seem excessive. But we need not suppose that people are so unsophisticated as to believe that that is the only harm crimes do. And once it
is shown that in terms of specifically criminal harm attempts and
successes do equal damage, what ground is there for supposing that
there would be any social outcry from retributivists for giving the two
crimes equal criminal penalties? We may, I think, lay this objection
aside with the others.
D. The Need for Evidence. It may be objected, however, that
throughout the whole discussion of social harm, social volatility and
the like, a number of crucial issues have been settled a priori which
really stand in need of empirical evidence. This, it may be urged, is
especially true of the claim that attempts are no less socially volatile
than successful crimes. How can one know such a thing a priori?
And until one knows it, mustn't the whole proposal for reform of
attempt law stand in abeyance?
This is an objection to be taken seriously, and indeed it does weaken
the proposal regarding criminal attempt. It does not, of course, strike
at the analysis of what is at stake in justifying the criminal/noncriminal distinction, but that does not allow one to bypass it in a discussion of the applicability of the analysis to this region of the criminallaw.
Two things need to be said. First, the amount of social harm done
by attempts as opposed to successes is an empirical issue, and it is
plaUSible to suppose that attempts at certain sorts of minor crimes
might well be a significantly lesser source of the requisite sort of
social harm than successes. I do not deny this, and would not dispute
a decision to grade such attempts a notch (or several notches) below
the corresponding successes. I have merely argued that there is no
reason to suppose that, in general, attempts do less criminal harm than
successes, and that we may thus establish a rebuttable presumption
in favor of equal penalties.
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Even so, it may asked whether this is not based on an indefensibly
a priori judgment. This leads to the second point which must be made.
I do not think the difficulty raised here must be regarded as decisive,
when one notices that some issues which are nominally empirical
really present no discoverable need for empirical investigation. A
good case in point is the contention that attempters stand no less in
need of reform than successful criminals (at least if their failure is
due to ineptness or intervening circumstances). For it is reform of
dispositions, behavior patterns, motivation and the like which is at
stake, and what reason is there for supposing that there is a significant
difference in such factors between attempters and the successful?
Likewise (though I admit, less conclusively) there seems to be little
discoverable need for empirical confirmation of the point that an
attempted armed robbery on a downtown street is just as disconcerting to passersby as a successful one, and that an increase in the
number of such attempts would cause just as much apprehensiveness
in people as would a corresponding increase in successes. One may
imagine a bizarre society in which practically no attempts at any
crime ever succeeded or did any harm to anyone, and so people were
more bemused by such happenings than alarmed by them. But that is
certainly not our situation. And so I think this objection, too, can be
laid aside.
IV

The analysis of social harm, its adequacy as a principle for making
the criminal/noncriminal distinction, and its applicability in principle
to the reform of criminal attempt law have probably been discussed
sufficiently for present purposes. No actual application of such an
analysis to the law, however, can end with such an abstract discussion. So in this section and the next, I want to take up a number of
objections which might be raised, not about the applicability of the
analysis "in the abstract," but about its relation to a whole set of concrete problems in the law-especially, but not exclUSively, in the area
of criminal attempts.

A. The Difficulty of Distinguishing Attempt from Mere Preparation.
It is notoriously difficult to draw a hard and fast line between acts
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merely preparatory to the commission of a crime and an actual attempt. It may be urged that to exact the same penalties for attempt
as for completion thus puts too much strain on decisions which are
often shaky anyway, and the result might be both a significant amount
of injustice (the very severe penalization of people who could reasonably have been held to be merely preparing to commit a crime, and
thus innocent of any criminal offense), and-to borrow a phrase from
Justice Frankfurter-the consequent sensationalization of the judicial
process with respect to trials for attempt. This is a serious enough
argument to require an extended examination.
Mere preparation, of course, is not an offense in either the common
law or the penal codes which have sprung from it. This is so, apparently, for two reasons, both similar to the reasons for not punishing
mere intent: first, the difficulty, in most merely preparatory stages,
of proving that the actions involved were really directed toward fulfilling a criminal intent (after all, one may buy poison for any number
of reasons); and second, the fact that one may always abandon
his criminal purpose during the preparatory stage, thus correcting his
own behavior and rendering punishment unjustifiable, while once he
has attempted the crime, it seems by definition too late to claim renunciation of the intent as an excuse-no more than one can claim
renunciation as an excuse upon completion of the crime.
The problem is, however, in deciding at what point, in the series of
steps leading towards the completion of the crime, an actual attempt
has been made. Some cases are clear: firing a gun at a man's head
with intent to murder is surely an attempt at murder. Going to a gunshop to choose a weapon for murder is clearly still at the stage of
preparation. But consider:
( a) A man met a fourteen-year-old boy in a park, took him to a
cafe and bought him ice cream. They then walked back to the park,
where the man sat with the boy on a bench, put his arm around him,
made indecent gestures to him, and engaged in indecent conversation
with him. He suggested to the boy that they sleep out together in the
park, and although he did not actually suggest participating in indecent conduct, asked the boy to meet him in the park the next night
and promised him money, a walk and a movie if he did so. The next
night the boy met him and was told it was too late for the movie but
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that they should take a walk together. At this point the man was
arrested and charged with attempting to procure the boy to commit
an act of gross indecency. He argued that his conduct did not constitute an attempt, but at most merely preparation. 21
(b) A man was talking with his employer about getting a raise, and
in the course of the conversation, began to pull a revolver from his
pocket. Before he could raise his arm, however, the employer grabbed
him. During the struggle, in which he was eventually disarmed without having fired, he said several times to the employer, "You've got
to die." He was charged with attempting to discharge a loaded revolver
with intent to do grievous bodily harm. It was objected on his behalf
that his acts did not constitute evidence of attempt.22
.
( c) A jeweler who had insured his stock against theft concealed
some of it in a recess under his safe, then tied himself up and called
for help. When the police came, he told them he had locked up, gone
upstairs and been knocked down and tied up by someone. The safe
was found open and empty. The police were not satisfied with the
story, and after searching the store, found the hidden merchandise.
Told of this, the jeweler confessed to having hoped to get insurance
money for the "stolen" goods. He was charged with attempting to
obtain money under false pretenses. He argued that at most his conduct was preparatory:23
( d) A man constructed and arranged combustibles in a building
with intent to commit arson in order to "injure the insurers" of the
building and its contents. The combustibles were ready to be lighted,
but on his way back to the building to do it-when he was some quarter
of a mile away-he changed his mind and drove away. He was arrested
for attempting to burn the building and injure the insurers. He argued
that his acts were merely preparatory.24
21. R. v. Miskell (I953) 37 Cr. App. R. 2I4. He was convicted and his appeal
dismissed.
22. R. v. Linneker [I906] 2 K.B. 99. He was convicted, and the conviction was
affirmed on appeal.
23. R. v. Robinson (I9I5) II Cr. App. R. I24. He was convicted, but on appeal
it was held that his acts were not enough to constitute an attempt and his conviction was quashed.
24. Commonwealth of Mass. v. Peaslee I77 Mass. 267; 59 N.E. 55 (I90I). He
was convicted, and on appeal the court suggested, but declined to decide, that
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(e) A group of anned men cruised the streets of an area of New
York City, looking for a particular payroll clerk whom they intended
to rob of about $1200. Their futile efforts to find the clerk led to their
surveillance and arrest by the police. They were charged with attempted robbery. They argued that their acts did not constitute
attempt. 25
These cases illustrate adequately, I think, the difficulty courts have
had in drawing the line between preparation and attempt. From time
to time there have been attempts to enunciate a general principle for
making the distinction, and there has been some progress in the sense
that a number of obvious candidates for a distinguishing principle
have been found inadequate. At least it may be said that the definitions of attempt now offered are a good deal more sophisticated
than, for example, the untenably narrow principle that the accused
must have done all that was necessary to actually commit the crime
to be guilty of an attempt. 26 Even Salmond failed to provide an adequate formulation:
An act done with intent to commit a crime is not a criminal attempt
unless it is of such a nature as to be in itself sufficient evidence of
the criminal intent with which it is done. A criminal attempt is an
act which shows criminal intent on the face of it. The case must
be one in which res ipsa loquitur. An act, on the other hand, which
is in its own nature and on the face of it innocent is not a criminal
attempt. 27

Clearly, though, it is not so much what we see (Le., the act) as what
we know (about the intent) which determines whether we regard
something as an attempt, and information on that can come from
sources other than the act-for example, from a confession. The act
the evidence was sufficient for a conviction for attempt. Instead it reversed the
conviction on an unrelated procedural ground.
25. People v. Rizzo 246 N.Y. 334; 158 N.E. 888 (1927). They were convicted,
but on appeal the conviction was reversed on the ground that their acts constituted mere preparation.
26. Enunciated by Parke, B. in R. v. Eagleton 6 Cox C.C. 559. This was thrown
out in R. v. White [19101 2 KB. 124 where it was held that the giving of the first
dose of pOison in series intended to cause death was attempted murder.
27. In R. v. Barker [19241 N.Z.L.R. 865.
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of turning the wheel which opens the sluice gates of a dam is ambiguous. Did the actor think he was opening the gates (thus intending to let the water out)? Or did he think he was making sure the
gates were closed? We cannot determine criminal intent merely from
this act. Yet if the actor later confessed an intent to open the gates
to flood the town, it would surely be odd to have to say that because
res ipsa loquitur non, he was not guilty of attempt.
As a result of the failures of general formulas, statutory definitions
of attempt have had to rely on vague formulations-for example, to
the effect that the criminal intent must be clear and the act toward
accomplishing the crime must be a "substantial step" toward the commission of the crime which is "strongly corroborative of the actor's
criminal purpose."28 One then relies on examples-drawn, naturally
enough, from the cases-to illustrate the meaning of "substantial step"
and "strongly corroborative."29 But it must be admitted that such
"definitions" of attempt are no more than guidelines; they are by no
means an exhaustive statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for attempts.
In the face of this difficulty, then, the argument may be pressed that
increasing the penalties for attempts to the level of the penalties for
completed crimes-especially in the case of first degree felonies, for
which the most severe penalties are exacted-demands a level of certainty in distinguishing preparation from attempt which simply cannot be achieved.
The reply to this argument must be made in several stages. First,
it should be noted that preparation/attempt is not the only distinction
in the criminal law which it is difficult to draw with precision. And
if we were to step down the penalties for crimes on the basis of the
"degree of difficulty" involved in determining whether they have been
committed, a number of unfortunate things would result. For one
thing, all crimes involving proof of intent would per se be subject
to a similar argument concerning "strain on a difficult distinction,"
28. See American Law Institute, Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. IO (1960)
§S.oI(1).
29. For example, from the Model Penal Code, op. cit., § 5.01 (2): examples
of "substantial steps": "(a) lying in wait, searching for or follOwing the contemplated victim of the crime; (b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated
victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission. . . ."
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for it is clear that if preparation vs. attempt is a difficult distinction
for the law to draw, conceptually, the existence/nonexistence of mens
rea is an even more difficult one, if not to draw, then at least to apply.
Yet that distinction is utterly fundamental to nearly all major criminal
proceedings.
Further, and closer to the subject at hand, the distinction between
attempt and completion itself-upon which the present law depends
for deciding the level of penalties to be assigned-is sometimes the
subject of dispute. Suppose X hits Y on the head with an ax, intending to murder him. Thinking Y dead (which he is not), X then throws
him off a cliff, or down an ant-bear hole, or into a river, in order to
hide his body. The second act is what actually kills Y. Now, X claims
that his intent to kill Y was extant only during the first act (hitting
Y on the head), and since that did not succeed, he can only be charged
with attempted murder. Mter all, the act that actually killed Y was
not intended to kill him at all, hence not itself an attempt at-or rather
success at-murder. 30
Difficulties in distinction-making are pervasive in the law, and while
we should not needlessly add to the list of difficulties, the reform of
the law of attempt suggested here is not such a needless addition.
If it is agreed for any class of crimes, in accord with the argument
in II above, that attempts and successes are eqUivalent criminal
wrongs, then the extension of equal treatment to both is hardly "needless." On the contrary, it-and it alone-satisfies one of the most fundamental principles of justice: that of equal treatment for relevantly
similar cases. And while it may "add" to a problem of proof, it also
"subtracts" from one: it eliminates the importance of making the sort
of discrimination between attempt and success striven for in the cases
just mentioned.
Borderline cases of attempt would, under the reform suggested, be
dealt with much as borderline cases of intent are presently dealt with.
If there is reasonable doubt that the act constitutes an attempt (com30. There are at least four such cases on the books. In one, Thabo Meli et al. v.
R. [I954] I W.L.R. 228; I AlI E.R. 373, the accused was convicted of murder. In
the other three (R. v. Khandu [I890] T.L.R. IS Born. I94; R. v. Shorty [I950]
S.R. 280; R. v. Chiswibo [I96I] 2 S.A. 714) the accused were convicted only of
attempt.
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pare: an intended, malicious injury), then it is treated as mere preparation (compare: mere accident) and not punished criminally. If
this has the effect of acquitting some reprehensible people who would
otherwise-under the lighter penalty for attempt-have been punished
at least a little bit, then so be it. This is perfectly consistent with the
fundamental principles of the standards of proof required in criminal
cases. a1
In fact, it would be distressing to think that standards of proof can
justifiably be lowered in the case of attempt as long as the penalties
are kept significantly lower than those for successful crimes. And this
is really what, underneath it all, the argument being dis~ussed here is
saying: that we need not be worried about making the wrong decisions
on borderline preparation/attempt cases as long as the penalties for
attempts are kept low. Such feelings may be justified in some cases
of distinction-making in the criminal law (the reverse-the increased
concern about getting things right-is surely warranted in the case
of capital crimes). But where the issue is one of conviction as opposed
to acquittal, as it is in the preparation/attempt cases, we cannot allow
31. It has been suggested by at least one eminent legal writer that we might
do well to make certain unambiguous preparations (which clearly fall short of
attempts) criminal in themselves. See Glanville Williams, "Police Control of
Intending Criminals," Criminal Law Review 66 (1965); and by the same author,
in Criminal Law: The General Part, pp. 632-633. And it may be noted that Soviet
law does just that. See Article 15 of Fundamentals of Criminal Legislation for
the USSR (official text in translation) (Moscow, 1960). This is a much more
radical change than that suggested here for the law of attempt, however, and I
am very sceptical, to say the least, about its justifiability. It would, no doubt,
allow us to deal more adequately with some frustrating cases (e.g., People v.
Rizzo, cited above). But the danger is, of course, that it would reach too far
back toward mere intent. Everyone will doubtless agree that mere imaginative
rehearsals (as distinct from intent) ought not to be made criminal. And punishment for mere intent is held by most to be similarly incompatible with the
principles of a free society. But it may also be that if we are to treat our fellows
as free, moral agents, we need to allow them more latitude in the process of
deciding right from wrong than that. It may be that we need to respect the
possibility of renunciation of criminal purpose enough not to reach back further
than an actual attempt. Merely making renunciation of intent an affirmative
defense (as Soviet law does: see Article 16 of the Fundamentals) does not answer this objection. It is the widest possible opportunity for renunciation which
is at stake, and it is clear that persons who could not have gone through with
even an attempt might well be caught before they had "had a chance" to change
their minds.
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ourselves the comfort of thinking that the problem can be minimized
by keeping the penalties for attempt one notch lower than those for
success. If there is reasonable doubt as to whether an act is criminal
at all (Le., in this case, should count as preparation or attempt), the
benefit should fall to the accused, just as it does when there is reasonable doubt that he actually intended to harm his victim. And if there
is no reasonable doubt as to whether the act is an attempt or not, the
decision will be obvious. In either case, the severity of the penalty for
attempt is not at issue. The reasons which justify the reasonable doubt
rule for criminal cases are well enough known not to require repetition
here.
In short, then, we may confidently dismiss the objection resting on
the difficulty of distinguishing attempt from preparation. There are,
however, some further objections to consider.
B. The Half-hearted Attempt. It may be argued that, just as some
attempts at suicide are really not attempts at all, but calls for help,
so some attempts at crimes are properly regarded as "something else" :
for example, as the working ouf of a desire, for whatever reason, to
be caught. Some criminals are caught in attempts so often that it is
hard for those intimately connected with them to interpret their behavior in any other way. It would be wrong, this argument goes, to
punish such "attempts" equally with successful crimes, since the actor
was not really trying to commit the crime so much as to get attention.
The reply to this, of course, is that if a distinction in penalties is
. to be made for those who attempt crimes for such motives, then it
should also be made for those whose attempts (for those motives)
just happen to succeed. If there are half-hearted attempts, there are
half-hearted successes as well. They should be treated alike. Whether,
then, the category of "half-hearted crimes" should receive lesser penalties than "whole-hearted" ones is a separate issue, and does not affect
the outcome of the proposal for reforming attempt law put forward
here.
C. The Encouragement of Second Thoughts. Another objection
which might be raised against the proposal, however, is that having
lesser penalties for attempt encourages "second thoughts" during the
commission of some crimes. Equalizing the penalties for attempts
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and completions eliminates one motive a person may have for stopping in the middle of an attempt, should he suddenly change his mind
about the wisdom of what he is doing. Thus the lesser penalty may
be a better deterrent in this case than the greater one.
A fairly straightforward response to this is that if we want to encourage second thoughts (i.e., abandonment of criminal purpose before the crime has been completed), we can do this directly, without
regard to the relative severity of penalties for attempts and completed
crimes, by making renunciation of intent an affirmative defense and/
or an admissible ground for mitigation. This is surely a much more
rational way of dealing with the problem than by simply excusing
from the heavier penalty all whose attempts fail to come off-for whatever reason. As it stands now, the person who gives up in the middle
of the attempt merely out of fatigue, or because he is interrupted by
the arrival of the police, is given the same penalty as one who has
given up because he has come to see the wrongfulness of his behavior.
Certainly in terms of the reformative aims of criminal sanctions, as
well as in terms of the amount of specifically criminal harm (social
volatility) produced, the genuine repentance must be distinguished
from attempts which fail for other reasons. 32
32. Making renunciation of intent an affirmative defense has its difficulties,
of course. Authorities are clear that "involuntary" abandonment of attempt (as
when a police patrol spots the activity and moves in, forcing the attempters to
run) cannot reasonably be a defense. But although voluntary abandonment is
also often said to fail as a defense, there are cases in which it has been accepted.
See, for example, People v. von Hecht 133 Cal. App. 2d 25; 282 P.2d 764 (1953);
and Weaver v. State (of Georgia) lI6 Ga. 550; 42 S.E. 745 (1902). For a review
of the authorities, see Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 10 (1960), §5.01.
The Model Penal Code, op. cit., §5.01(4) recommends that renunciation of
intent be an affirmative defense if it is "complete and voluntary." On the meaning of "complete and voluntary," it says: "renunciation of criminal purpose is
not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present
or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the
probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous
time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim."
In 1967, New York adopted a similar version of this doctrine: New York Penal
Law §34.45.
. Not all cases are easy to evaluate on such grounds, however. Consider Le
Baron v. State (of Wisconsin) 32 Wisc. 294; 145 N.E.2d 79 in which the defend-
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Still, in all fairness, one must recognize the possibility that penalizing attempts and completions equally might in some cases weaken
the motive for giving up before completion. This would not, of course,
be so for anyone who is prepared to renounce his criminal purpose as
a matter of moral principle. But one who is merely in personal turmoil about the rightness of advisability of his conduct, or one who
has come to believe it is simply highly unlikely that he will be able
to succeed anyway, may well reflect that he might as well go ahead.
Mter all, convincing a jury that he gave up due to a renunciation of
intent is an uncertain business at best. Yet if he cannot convince them
of that, thus getting a lesser penalty, it really does not matter whether
he finishes the crime or not. He will get the same penalty in either
case if he is caught. As Huck Finn puts it: "... what's the use of learning to do right when it's troublesome to do right and it ain't no trouble
to do wrong, and the wages is just the same?"33
Even acknowledging this problem, however, the gains to be gotten
for the reformative aims of penal sanctions by equalizing the penalties
for attempt and success seem to me to outweigh the possible disadvantages noted. Once again, then, an objection to the proposed reform
seems to be met adequately.
D. Impossible Attempts. The proposal may, nevertheless, be attacked on yet another ground. In cases in which the crime attempted
was impossible of accomplishment, one may argue that it is unfair to
treat the offender even on a par with other attempters, let alone those
who are successful. Consider: a man who, as it turns out in the course
of the event, is impotent, seizes a woman and tries to rape her. It was
physically impossible for him to have achieved his purpose. Can he
be guilty of attempted rape?34 Or consider a man who "places an ilant forced a woman into a shack and up against the wall and made further
moves in preparation to rape her. The woman was finally able to convince him
that she was pregnant and that he would hurt her baby if he proceeded. He gave
up the attempt, warning her that if she screamed or went to the police after he
left, he would kill her. It is uncertain whether this would fall within the meaning
of "complete and voluntary" renunciation as defined above.
33. Mark Twain, Huckleberry Finn in The Complete Works of Mark Twain
(Garden City, 1964), chap. 16, p. 810.
34. Preddy v. Commonwealth (of Virginia) 184 Va. 765; 36 S.E.2d 349 (1946).
He was found guilty of attempt.
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legal bet" on a horse which, as it turns out, has been scratched from
the race an hour before. Is he guilty of an attempt to place an illegal
bet?35 Or consider a man who attempts to buy what he thinks are
stolen goods. They are not. Can he be convicted of an attempt to
receive stolen property?36
As can be seen, there has been some conflict among the cases as to
the legitimacy of the defense of impossibility. More often than not,
the courts have rejected the defense, as have academic writers. 37 But
whatever the resolution of the conflict turns out to be, we may safely
argue that whatever is to be done with "impossible attempts" should
be done on the issue of whether they are to be regardeq. as attempts
at all. If they are, then one can see no reason for treating them differently than other attempts. If they are not, then the question does not
arise.
E. Generosity. Finally, it may be wise to comment on the sort of
objection suggested by Plato's remarks (above, note 9). The suggestion is that when the attempt does not come off, it is only gracious
of us to exercise the virtue of generosity, to reduce the penalty as a
way of marking the proper human response (i.e., joy, relief . . .) to
fortuitous and happy turns of fate which prevented the completion
of the crime. Such an objection is not in the least frivolous (though
I have not given it the development it deserves). Benevolence and
related virtues are of the first importance in the moral life, and there
is every reason to believe, at least in terms of moral theory, that considerations of what conduct would be virtuous with respect to criminal
attempts ought to carry as much weight as considerations of what
duties we have toward society and what values are involved in various
sorts of policies on criminal attempt. 3S Unfortunately for this objection, however, while spontaneous generosity "for no good reason" is
35. O'Sullivan v. Peters (1951) SR (South Australia) 54. He was convicted.
36. People (of New York) v. Jaffe 184 N.Y.497; 78 N.E. 169 (1906). It was
held, on appeal, that since the crime he intended to commit could not possibly
have been consummated even if he had succeeded in buying the goods, he could
not be found guilty of an attempt.
37. For a good overview of the problem, see Kadish and Paulsen, Criminal Law
and Its Processes, pp. 393-410.
38. I have argued for this thesis at length in On Justifying Moral Judgments
(London and New York, 1973).
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something without which life would hardly be bearable, its ossification
into a policy (such as punishing all attempts less severely than suc~
cesses) eliminates its spontaneity, and hence, a necessary feature of
what makes it virtuous to begin with. So again, the proposal for treating attempts on a par with successes must stand.

v
Some concern, however, may understandably be directed toward the
question of the ramifications of this reform. In particular, the analysis
of the nature of criminality given above has two rather startling consequences which deserve mention, not to say further study.
A. Criminal Negligence. If criminal harms come not from the con~
sequences of the victim's injuries, but rather from the consequences
of the ways in which those harms come about, then an argument
analogous to the one for treating criminal attempt and success equally
suggests itself for cases of what might be called "uneventful" and
"eventful" criminal negligence. Take the case of reckless driving.
Suppose two men are driving in equally reckless ways-at night, perhaps, in cars whose brakes and steering could not pass inspection standards, and through a residential section at high speed. One is unlucky
enough to hit and kill a pedestrian who unwittingly steps into the
street. The other had passed by the same spot, "uneventfully," in the
same criminally reckless manner, several moments earlier. The criminality of the acts is, it seems, equal, and the acts therefore ought to
be punished equally. Yet we charge the one with only reckless driving,
a relatively minor offense, and the other with negligent manslaughter.
The difference in the two offenses is one of mere chance, just as is
the difference between the assassin whose bullet hits the belt buckle
and the one whose bullet finds its target. To be consistent with the
analysis of criminal attempt given here, then, it seems we should
equalize the penalties for both "uneventful" and "eventful" negligence.
Resistance to any such proposal would doubtless be strong-and
based on a complex of factors, not the least of which is the difficulty
of determining degrees of negligence prospectively. Just as occasionally we may use the very fact that an injury resulted from some sort
of unusual conduct as evidence that the conduct was negligent, so
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too it may happen that we cannot determine whether an act was
negligent, or how negligent it was, in the absence of some physical
damage done. This proof problem, it may be argued, militates against
extending the attempt argument analogously to uneventful negligence. But it is clear that the issue needs careful analysis.
As to whether such a startling consequence casts a question mark
over the adequacy of the whole analysis of criminal wrongs proposed
here, I can only remark that it is not at all unusual for the law to
have to depart from even the clearest and most thoroughly grounded
rules, principles or conceptualizations for reasons of equity or even
practicality. If that is so in this case, it need not destroy the value of
the analysis for other parts of the criminal law.
B. Motive vs. Intent. Another consequence suggested by the account
of criminality given here is the reform of the criminal law's traditional
refusal to differentiate offenses on the ground of motive, as opposed
to intent. If, again, criminal harms come from the consequence of
the way in which the victim's injuries (or the social harms) are accomplished, then it seems irrational to exclude a consideration of
motive in grading offenses. We respond very differently (and in ways
which alter the social harms done) to violations of the law done
as a matter of civil disobedience than we do to the same violations
done for purely personal and antisocial motives. Yet the law as it
stands does not allow a consideration of motive to enter the judicial
process in determining the seriousness of the crime (except as a
matter of discretionary prosecution or as a matter of judicial discretion in sentencing).39 It might be argued, then, that the reform
of attempt law proposed here should be extended to include a reform
of the law with regard to motive. Like the extension with regard to
criminal negligence, however, I suspect that a rather extensive inquiry would be needed to assess such a suggestion.
39. See, for example, Chandler v. DPP [1962] 3 W.L.R. 694 in which protesters
at a Royal Air Force base were not permitted to defend their illegal acts in terms
of their motives of civil disobedience. For an argument in favor of exercising
prosecutorial and sentencing discretion with respect to some forms of civil disobedience, see Ronald Dworkin, "On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience," reprinted in Murphy, Civil Disobedience and Violence (Belmont, Calif., 1971), pp.
112-130.
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C. Transferred Intent. Finally, in addition to these somewhat problematic extrapolations, the theory of criminality given here has at
least one rather straightforward extension: it renders the transferred
malice (or intent) rule easily intelligible. The rule is, oversimply, that
when X is trying to murder Y, but misses and accidentally kills Z, his
malice or intent toward Y "transfers" to Z and he may be charged
with murder.
On the basis of the usual theory of crimes, the rule is a bit problematical, for it looks as though the criminal is punished either for the
unintended result (the accidental harm done a bystander) or the mere
intent toward the intended victim. One alternative is uncomfortable
in terms of standard accounts of the rationale for the mens rea requirement; the other is uncomfortable in terms of the principle of not
punishing mere intent. Clearly, understanding criminal wrong as the
social instability created by the process of doing certain things provides a ready and easily intelligible rationale for the transferred malice
rule. 40
Perhaps enough has been said, then, to establish the main points:
that reform of the theory of the law of crimes, and the consequent
reform of the law of criminal attempt, are clearly indicated as part
of the continuing process of rationalizing the criminal law. The
analogous extensions of these reforms will, of course, have to be subjected to further study. But the lines of inquiry look promising, and
it appears that they will confirm rather than disconfirm the results
reached here.
40. For a clear statement of the difficulties in the traditional justification for
transferred malice, see Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part,
§49. And on the U.S. version, see LaFave and Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law,
pp. 252-255·

